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Abstract 
Illegal reproduction is increasingly becoming a major 
concern of companies and the society. Previous research 
has shown when network effect is strong, piracy could 
be beneficial for firms. However, some researchers got 
that strong network effects can sometimes lead to a firm 
choosing higher levels of copyright protection. How to 
choose the investment strategy for firms in this society with 
prevalent piracy? There are two strategies: no copyright 
protection and setting copyright protection. We address 
two questions in a monopoly and duopoly setting. Frist, 
what effects the attractiveness of each of the two strategies? 
Second, under which conditions will any particular strategy 
dominate another? We show that in a monopoly setting, 
firms prefer not to take a copyright protection with higher 
level of network effect and more support-piracy consumers. 
In a duopoly setting, the equilibrium of game theory is at 
the choice of the strategy of copyright protection.
Key words: Piracy; Network externality; Copyright 
protection strategy; Customer category 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, more and more illegal reproduction of products 
is becoming a large concern for both the society and the 
industry. In 2010, the Business Software Alliance said that 
42% of software is pirated, which leads to an estimated 
loss of more than $59 billion to firms. However, copying 
of intellectual property is not limited to software. Piracy 
of music and movies is a major concern to the society, and 
some researchers have suggested that it will lead to radical 
changes in the industry (Moul, 2006). With growth of 
Internet, piracy is becoming even more prevalent because 
copying of intellectual properties is becoming easier and 
more difficult to prevent. And some companies have also 
tried to combat piracy by making their products more 
difficult to cope using digital rights management software. 
For example, Intuit incorporated a feature in its 2003 
TurboTax such that the software could only be installed 
on one computer and Windows XP has an activation code; 
and some other companies never take any measure to 
prevent the piracy. 
If piracy can increase the market size, when exist 
network externality, then company may get some income 
because of piracy. Recently some researchers have done 
some work about this. For example Conner and Rumelt 
(1991) and Takeyama (1994) assume that copying by 
individuals confers a network externality that benefit users 
of the product. Shy and Thisse (1999) extent the monopoly 
results of Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Takeyama (1994) 
to a duopoly framework and divided the consumers into 
two categories, high-valuation consumers who do not 
copy and low-valuation consumers who potentially can 
copy. Their results show that firms can benefit by not 
protecting their software if net- work externality is strong 
with allowing piracy increases the market size. When 
piracy can increase the market size, piracy is beneficial 
for the firms. But if piracy couldn’t increase market 
size, in a saturated market or market with limited growth 
opportunity, some previous researchers have examined 
this situation. Jain (2008) examined if the market is 
saturated and there is limited opportunity for market 
growth, higher network effect can actually lead to higher 
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levels of copyright protection. Some other researchers 
showed that a corporation may choose different copyright 
strategy in different place with different piracy rate, 
for example, Ye (2006) have examined Microsoft has 
different strategy in different country and region. He will 
choose high levels of copyright protection if there has 
high piracy rate, vice versa. So we can see that different 
ratio of consumers would affect the choice of firms. And 
the purpose of this paper is examining the effect of ratio 
of consumers to the strategy of firms. 
This paper base on Shy and Thisse (1999), reexamine 
the effect of network and initial ratio of consumers to the 
choice of firms’ copyright protection strategy, when the 
market is saturated and there is limited opportunity for 
market growth. But they do not examined the choice of 
copyright protection strategy for firms with the different 
ratio of customers. We divide the consumers into two 
categories, no-support-piracy consumers who think the 
quality of pirated product is low and pirate is immorality 
and support-piracy consumers who think the pirate can 
replace the legal copy (see jain 2008 and Shy and Thisse 
1999). When company chooses copyright protect, pirate 
could not satisfy the support- piracy consumers, so some 
of these consumers may support the legal copy. And these 
consumers become the no-support-piracy consumers. 
This paper examines two simple situations: Oligopoly and 
Duopoly. First, we use the Hotelling model to examine 
the situation of Oligopoly, then use the game model for 
Duopoly. We contrast two strategies: (a) no copyright 
protection. (b) Setting copy- right protection. We conclude 
that: firms prefer to not take a copyright protection with 
higher level of network effect and more support-piracy 
consumers under the first situation. And firms will have 
more opportunity to take the copyright protection with 
high level of network effect. Under the second situation, 
whenever what copyright protection one firm choose, the 
other one will choose a level of copyright protection. 
1.  MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
1.1  Oligopoly
We first consider a monopolist selling to differentiated 
consumers. And there exist so- me other pirated 
corporation. We assume that the monopolist (firm 1) is at 
one end of the Hotelling line, in particular, at 0. 
We assume that there are two segments of consumers. 
The first segment of consumers do not support pirated 
product. The second of consumers support pirated 
product. We don’t take the cost of product into account. 
We use Hotelling model, and quote the conventional 
maximization to compare benefit. We also assume that a 
firm couldn’t pursue benefit maximization after entering 
one market but to grab market share (Ye, 2006). So our 
purpose is comparing the benefit under pursue market 
share maximization. 
Let α denotes level of copyright protection where 
(0,1)α ∈ . β denotes initial ratio of no-support-pirate 
consumers where (0,1)β ∈ , the other is 1 β−  . we assume 
that firms take α level of copyright protection to defense 
pirate, then there is (1 )β α−  second segment consumers 
turn to support the legal copy because of lacking pirated 
product. We assume that all market demand have been 
completely satisfy (Sun, Xie, & Cao, 2006). Most 
intellectual product has network effect, and its fixed 
cost is high ,its marginal cost is low. So we assume its 
marginal cost is 0. 
This paper contrast two strategies: (a) No copyright 
protection. Under this strategy, whenever there exist 
pirate or not, company never choose the copyright 
protection. (b) Setting copyright protection. Under this 
strategy, company must choose some levels of copyright 
protection to defense pirate. Each consumer demands 
either 1 or 0 unit of the product. And an individual will 
buy the product if the resulting surplus is nonnegative. 
And the market is saturated and there is limited 
opportunity of market growth. 
1.1.1  Decision Behavior of Strategy I
We assume that there exist a city line and the length is 1. 
The consumers are homogeneous along the line. And let 
x denote the location of consumer. The distance between 
x and endpoint is the cost of transport (jain 2006). The 
reservation price of a consumer, x, is defined U=K+γQ–x 
(Jain, 2006; Sun, Xie, & Cao, 2004), where K (0≤K≤1) is 
the quality of product. γ (0<γ<1) measures the strength of 
the net- work effect. Q is the expected network size, and 
Q=1. 
0 X 1
Figure 1
City Line
Let ijP 、 ijπ  denote the price and income, where let 
i denotes the industry {1, 2}i∈ , j denotes the strategy, 
{1, 2}j∈ . The monopolist must demand the first segment 
consumers, so the price of product must satisfy the 
following condition: 
11 1P K Qγ β≤ + −
So the income of the monopolist is 11 11 *Pπ β= . 
We assume the quality is 1, 1 1K = . So we have: 
Lemma 1. If the monopolist take strategy I, then its 
best decision is: when *11 1P K Qγ β= + − , the monopolist 
will get the best income: 
*
11 (1 )π β γ β= + −  (1)
1.1.2  Decision Behavior of Strategy II
With piracy, the monopolist will take a copyright 
protection strategy and take α level of copyright 
protection. Then there a (1 )β α− g  of the second segment 
consumers turn to support the legal copy. The monopolist 
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must pay for this, we assume this cost is 2mα , (0,1)m∈  
(Jain, 2006). The monopolist must demand all the 
first segment consumers and the consumers no more 
support- piracy of the second segment consumers, so the 
price of product must satisfy the following condition: 
12 1 ( (1 ) )P K Qγ β β α≤ + − + − . And its income function 
is:
2
12 12 ( (1 ) )P mπ β β α α= + − −
Then we have: 
Lemma 2. If the monopolist take strategy II, then its 
best decision is: when *12 1 ( (1 ) )P K Qγ β β α= + − + − .
The monopolist will get the best income: 
*
12 (1 ( (1 ) ))(π γ β β α β= + − + − +
2(1 ) ) mβ α α− −  (2)
Now we compare the profits under these two strategy: 
* * 2 2
11 12 ((1 ) )mπ π β α− = − + +  (2 1 )(1 )β γ β α− − −  (3)
Proposition 1. (1) If 2β–1–γ ≥ 0, or 
1
2
γβ +≥ , the firm 
will take strategy I. (2) If 2β–1–γ<0, or 
1
2
γβ +< , (i) if 0<γ 
≤ m,the firm will take strategy II and take a low levels of 
copyright protection.(ii) if 1m γ< < , ① when 10 β β< < , 
the firm will take strategy II; ② when 1
1
2
γβ β +≤ ≤ , the 
firm will take strategy II and take a low levels of copyright 
protection. Where 
2
1
1 (1 ) 4( )
2
mγ γ γ
β
+ − + + −
= .
The ratio of first segment of consumers is beyond one 
half, without network effect, the firm adopt strategy II. 
When there exist network effect, as the network effect 
increasing, even the ratio of first segment of consumers 
is beyond one half, the monopolist may choose copyright 
protection strategy. That is to say the monopolist have 
larger probability to take copyright protection strategy 
with net- work effect. If the strength of network effect 
is strong and the first segment is low, then whenever 
copyright protection the monopolist takes, the benefit 
of strategy II always be more than strategy I’s. This is 
because strong network effect will cause high reservation 
price of consumers, then the price of product could be 
high, and if the first segment consumers is beyond one 
half, the monopolist will take copyright protection to 
increase the output of its product for more income. 
Character 1. When network effect become stronger, 
the monopolist prefer to choose strategy II. 
In a monopoly, when
1
2
γβ +< ,  the monopolist 
will take copyright protection. We know that if γ→1 
(network effect become strong), the monopolist has 
more opportunity to take copyright protection strategy 
to win more benefit because of β has increased. So the 
monopolist has bigger possibility to choose strategy II 
with much stronger network effect. That is because much 
stronger net- work effect result in higher production price, 
which will refuse some consumers to buy its product. And 
in order to get benefit maximization the monopolist must 
take copyright protection to strive for more consumers. 
1.2  Duopoly
We now assume that there is a second firm in the market 
at the other end of the Hotelling line, i.e., at 1. And we 
assume the two firms are homogeneous, just have the 
same product and share the market. The other assumption 
are very similar to those of the monopoly case. Let Pijk 
and πijk denote the price and benefit of firms, where the 
sub-script i is used to denoted the number of firms in 
the market, j denotes the strategy, k is the firm. And we 
assume the firms choose the copyright protection strategy 
in sequential. 
1.2.1  All Choose Strategy I
Under this situation, we know that the firms have β 
consumers, so each have 
2
β
. Follow 1.1.1, we have: 
Lemma 3. If all firms choose strategy I, then their best 
decisions are: when firm 1 and firm 2 have the price:
*
211 1 2
P K Q βγ= + −
and *212 2 2
P K Q βγ= + −
The two firms will get the best income: 
*
211 1( )2 2
K Qβ βπ γ= + −  (4)
*
212 2( )2 2
K Qβ βπ γ= + −  (5)
1.2.2  Firm 1 Chooses Strategy II, Firm 2 Chooses 
Strategy I
Firm 1 chooses strategy II, then firm 1 can get (1 )
2
β α β+ − 
(1 )
2
β α β+ − of market share, where (1 )α β−  is the consumers 
who turn to support the legal copy from the second 
segment. And the market share of firm 2 is . Follow 
1.1.1 and 1.1.2, we know:
Lemma 4. If Firm 1 chooses Strategy II, firm 2 chooses 
Strategy I, then their best decisions are: when firm 1 
and firm 2 have the price: *221 1 ( (1 ))2
P K Q βγ α β= + − + −  
and *212 2 2
P K Q βγ= + − , the two firms will get the best 
income: 
*
221 1( ( 2
K Q βπ γ= + − + (1 )))( (1 ))
2
βα β α β− + −  (6)
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*
212 2( )2 2
K Qβ βπ γ= + −  (7)
However, because two firms are homogeneous, the 
situation of Firm 1 chooses Strategy I, firm 2 chooses 
Strategy II is the same as this situation. So we no longer 
discuss this situation.
1.2.3  All Choose Strategy II
When firm 2 take α′  level of copyright protection, 
firm 2 will have (1 )αβ− ′  proportion of second segment 
consumers. And firm 1 gets (1 )(1 )βα α− −′ ′′  proportion of 
second segment consumers. Because of sequential choice, 
we use P'221 denotes the optimal price of firm 1. Then we 
have:
Lemma 5. If all firms choose strategy II, then their 
best decisions are: when firm 2 has the price:
*
222 2 ( (1 ))2
P K Q βγ α β′= + − + − , then firm 2 gets the 
optimal income:
222 2( ( (1 )))K Qπ γ α β′= + − + −
2( (1 ))
2
mβ α β α′ ′• + − −  (8)
When firm 1 has the optimal price: *221 1 ( (1 )(1 ))2
P K Q βγ α α β′ ′′ ′= + − + − −
*
221 1 ( (1 )(1 ))2
P K Q βγ α α β′ ′′ ′= + − + − − , firm 1 gets the optimal income, 
use π'221 to denote it: 
*
221 1( ( (1 )(1 )))2
K Q βπ γ α α β′ ′′ ′= + − + − −
2( (1 )(1 ))
2
mβ α α β α′′ ′ ′′• + − − −  (9)
This is a game model. The partners is the two firms. 
We assume 1 2 1K K= = , because we think the two firms 
are homogeneous. 
(1) When firm 2 chooses strategy I, and firm 1 
chooses strategy I, the optimal income of firm 1 
is *211 (1 )2 2
β βπ γ= + − . If firm 1 chooses strategy II, its 
o p t i m a l  i n c o m e  i s *221 (1 ( (1 )))( (1 ))2 2
β βπ γ α β α β= + − + − + −
*
221 (1 ( (1 )))( (1 ))2 2
β βπ γ α β α β= + − + − + − 2mα− . 
Now we compare the two optimal incomes, then we 
have:
* * 2 2
221 211 ((1 ) )mπ π β α− = − − + + (1 )(1 )γ β β α+ − −  (10)
Proposition 2. In Duopoly, when firm 2 chooses 
strategy I, (1) if γ>m，①when 1
mβ
γ
> − , firm 1 will 
take strategy II, and he will take a low level of copyright 
protection. ② When 1
mβ
γ
< − , firm 1 will take strategy 
II. (2) If mγ ≤ , when (0,1)β ∈ , firm 1 will choose a low 
level of copyright protection. 
So we know when one of duopoly chooses strategy 
I-Without any measure, then another also chooses strategy 
II- Setting copy- right protection. Along coefficient 
m increasing, the probability of firm choosing copy- 
right protection is becoming low. That is because that 
coefficient m is cost coefficient, if m is becoming high, 
firms will decrease the level of copyright protection to 
reduce the cost. 
(2) When firm 2 chooses strategy II, and firm 1 
chooses strategy I, then the optimal income of firm 1 
is *211 (1 )2 2
β βπ γ= + − . firm1 chooses strategy II, its 
optimal income is *221 (1 ( (1 )(1 )))2
βπ γ α α β′ ′′ ′= + − + − −
2( (1 )(1 ))
2
mβ α α β α′′ ′ ′′• + − − − .
Now we compare the two optimal incomes, then we 
have:
* * 2 2 2
221 211 ( (1 ) (1 ) )mπ π β α α′ ′ ′′− = − + − − +
(1 )(1 )(1 )γ β β α α′ ′′+ − − −  (11)
Proposition 3. In Duopoly, (1) if γ>m, and when firm 
2 chooses a low level of copyright protection, ① if β<β2, 
firm 1 also take strategy II. ② If β≥β2, firm 1 will choose 
a low level of copyright protection. When firm 2 chooses 
a high level of copyright protection, firm 1 will take a low 
level of copyright protection. Where 
2 2
2
(1 )(2 ) (1 ) (2 ) 4 (1 )[(1 )( ) ]
2 (1 )
mα α γ α α γ α α α α γ
β
α α
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− + − − + − − − + −
=
′ ′−
(2) If γ>m, ① if 2 1mγ > − , when firm 2 chooses 
modern level of copyright protection, i) when β<β3, firm 1 
will take strategy II, ii) when β≥β3, firm 1 will take a low 
level of copyright protection, and if firm 2 chooses a high 
or low level of copyright protection, firm 1 will take a low 
level of copyright protection. Where 
2 2
3
(1 )(2 ) (1 ) (2 ) 4 (1 )[(1 )( ) ]
2 (1 )
mα α γ α α γ α α α α γ
β
α α
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− + − − + − − − + −
=
′ ′−
② if 2 1mγ < − , whatever copyright protection firm 
2 chooses, firm 1 will choose a low level of copyright 
protection. 
In Duopoly, when one firm chooses no taking any 
copyright protection, and if the network effect is strong 
and the consumers who do not support piracy are less of 
one half, another firm will choose copyright protection. 
Or if the network effect is weak and the consumers who 
do not support piracy exceed one half, another firm will 
choose a low level of copyright protection. So we know 
that if one firm chooses copyright protection strategy 
first, then another also chooses protecting, only some 
time a low level of copyright protection. That is because 
weak copyright protection can refuse some price-sensitive 
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consumers, decreasing the price competition. In a word, 
the point of this game theory is the two firms all choose 
strategy II. 
There are some difference between the situation of 
Oligopoly and Duopoly in a market. If there is only 
one firm (firm 1) in market, if
1
2
γβ +> , firm 1 will 
not choose copyright protection. However if there is 
another firm (firm 2) in the market, under the same 
condition, whatever copyright protection firm 2 chooses, 
firm 1 always chooses copyright protection. We assume 
that when there is only one firm in a market, this firm 
occupies the whole consumers who support the legal 
copy. If another firm joins in, it is inevitable to aggravate 
the market com- petition, and the share of consumers 
is becoming low. Form our model, the price of firm’s 
product maybe increases. And this will refuse some 
price-sensitive consumers. So firms will take copyright 
protection to get more consumers to get more benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines how to choose copyright protection 
strategy under considering network effect and customers 
category. And we compare two strategy: no copyright 
protection and setting copyright protection. Then we 
divide the consumers into two parts: no-support-piracy 
consumers and support- piracy consumers. First we 
consider a mono- poly setting, our results suggest that 
stronger network effect is, the firm will prefer to choose 
setting copyright protection. And if the first segment of 
initial consumers is beyond one half and network effect 
is weak, the firm prefer to not set copyright protection. In 
Duopoly, we get that the point of game is two firm choose 
copyright protection. 
This paper has done some work about the choice of 
copyright protection with net- work effect and customers 
category, and generates some conclusion. But the model 
of this paper is strict in assumption, because of the 
demand of simplifying research. And in real market, there 
are lots of other situation, such as when the firms have 
some products with different quality, the equilibrium of 
market will change. So future research can examine how 
different quality affect the choice of copyright protection 
of firms. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
We have
* * 2 2
11 12 ((1 ) ) (2 1 )mπ π β α β γ− = − + + − − (1 )β α• − , 
Which we denote as f(α). This is a Quad- ratic function 
about α, and is pointing up. 
(1) When 2β–1–γ>0, we know f(α)>0, where (0,1)α ∈ . 
(2) When 2β–1–γ≤0, the symmetrical axis of f(α) is in 
the positive part. Now we discuss the value of function 
f(1) is plus or not. ① If the value is plus, which can notes 
as –β2+(1+γ)β–γ+m>0.
When β=1, then f(1)=m>0. And if
1
2
γβ += , we know 
f(1)>0. So when γ<m, and (0,1)β ∈ , we can get f(1)>0. 
when γ>m, and β1<β<1, we know f(1)>0. So we have 
known that when 1(0, )α α∈ , where 1 (0,1)α ∈ , there will 
exist f(α)<0. When 1( ,1)α α∈ , there be f(α)>0. Where 
1 2
(1 2 )(1 )
(1 )m
γ β βα
β
+ − −
=
+ −
② If the value is minus, which can notes as –β2+(1+γ)
β–γ+m<0.
So when γ>m and 0<β<β1, we know f(1)<0. And in 
this condition when (0,1)α ∈ , we have f(α)<0. Where 
2
1
1 (1 ) 4( )
2
mγ γ γ
β
+ − + + −
=
Proof of Proposition 2
We have
* * 2 2
221 211 ((1 ) ) (1mπ π β α γ− = − − + + + − )(1 )β β α− ,
Where α is decision variable. Which we denote as 
φ(α). And φ(α) is a Quadratic function about α, and is 
pointing downward. Symmetrical axis of φ(α) is in the 
positive part. 
Now we discuss the value of function φ(1) is plus or 
not. And
2(1) ((1 ) ) (1 )(1 )mϕ β γ β β= − − + + + − − (1 ) mγ β= − −  (12)
(1) If the value is plus. Only when γ>m. So we get that 
when 1
mβ
γ
< − , always existing * *221 211π π>  ; 
(2) If the value is minus, we have 1
mβ
γ
> − . If γ≤m, 
then (0,1)β ∈ ; if γ>m, then (1 ,1)
mβ
γ
∈ − . Under these 
conditions, we get when 2(0, )α α∈ , then 
* *
221 211π π> ; 
when 2( ,1)α α∈ , then 
* *
221 211π π< . 
Where 2 2
(1 )(1 ) (0,1)
(1 ) m
γ β βα
β
+ − −
= ∈
− +
Proof of Proposition 3
We have
* * 2 2 2
221 211 ( (1 ) (1 ) )mπ π β α α′ ′ ′′− = − + − − +
(1 )(1 )(1 )γ β β α α′ ′′+ − − −
Where α" is decision variable. Which we denote as 
g(α"). And g(α") is a Quadratic function about α, and is 
pointing downward. The symmetrical axis of g(α") is in 
the positive part. We know g(0)=0, and
2 2(1) ( (1 ) (1 ) ) (1g m β α γ′= − + − − + + −
)(1 )(1 )β β α′− −
2(1 ) (2(1 ) (1α α β α α′ ′ ′ ′= − − − + −
) ) ( )(1 ) mα γ β γ α α′ ′ ′+ + − −  (13)
Which we denote as h(β), and is pointing downward. 
The symmetrical axis of it is on the right side of β=1. And 
h(1)= –m<0 .h(0)=(γ+α' )(1–α' )–m.
2 (1 ) mα γ α γ′ ′= − + − + −  (14)
We denote h(0) as l(α' ), and it is poi- nting downward. 
The symmetrical axis of l(α' ) is between 0 and 1. And we 
know 
(1) 0l m= − < , (0)l mγ= −
(1) when γ>m, we can get: ① there existing α'1 satisfy 
that when 1(0, )α α′ ′∈ , we have h(0)>0. If 2(0, )β β∈ , then 
g(1)>0, then g(α")>0; if 2( ,1)β β∈ , then g(1)>0. Then 
there exist α"1 satisfy when 1(0, )α α′′ ′′∈ , we have g(α")>0. 
②when 1( ,1)α α′ ′∈ , then h(0)<0, so we have g(1)<0. 
We also can get α"1 satisfying that when 1(0, )α α′′ ′′∈ , then 
( ) 0g α′′ > . Where
2
1
1 (1 ) 4( m)
2
γ γ γ
α
− + − + −
′ = 、
1 2 2
(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )m
γ β β αα
β α
′+ − − −′′=
′+ − −
、
2 2
2
(1 )(2 ) (1 ) (2 ) 4 (1 )[(1 )( ) ]
2 (1 )
mα α γ α α γ α α α α γ
β
α α
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− + − − + − − − + −
=
′ ′−
(2) when γ<m, we have: ① when 2 1mγ > − or γ>0, 
we know l(α' )=0 is solvable. Then when 2 3( , )α α α′ ′ ′∈ , we 
have h(0)>0. Where α'1 , α'3 are two roots of l(α' ). And 
there exists β3, which make when 3(0, )β β∈ , there 
exists g(1)>0. then we have g(α")>0; when 1(0, )α α′ ′∈  or 
1( ,1)α α′ ′∈ , we get h(0)<0. So if (0,1)β ∈ , then g(1)<0. 
So there exists α"2, which can satisfy that when 2(0, )α α′′ ′′∈ , 
the equation g(α")>0 is setup. Where 
2
2
1 (1 ) 4( m)
2
γ γ γ
α
− − − + −
′ = 、
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2
3
1 (1 ) 4( m)
2
γ γ γ
α
− + − + −
′ = 、
2 2 2
(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )m
γ β β αα
β α
′+ − − −′′ =
′+ − −
、
2 2
3
(1 )(2 ) (1 ) (2 ) 4 (1 )[(1 )( ) ]
2 (1 )
mα α γ α α γ α α α α γ
β
α α
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− + − − + − − − + −
=
′ ′−
② when 2 1mγ < − ,l(α' )=0 is unsolvable. Then 
when (0,1)α′∈ , h(0)<0 sets up. And when (0,1)β ∈ , then 
we have g(1)<0. So there exists α"3, which makes when 
3(0, )α α′′ ′′∈ , there will exist g(α")>0. Where
3 2 2
(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )m
γ β β αα
β α
′+ − − −′′ =
′+ − −
And the premise of all of ② is 
1
4
m ≥ , so when 
1
4
m < , 
there only exist the situation ①.
